

Good afternoon.

In your first operational update I intend to give you a very broad overview of the **major operations currently supporting the MNFI Joint Campaign Plan and Joint Campaign Action Plan**

Hopefully you will view Strategic Operations as the most recognizable component of what is admittedly a unique staff ... or you may view the idea of "Strategic Operations" as an intractable oxymoron.

Simply put, we are the complementary component of your staff that does not dwell on desired conditions or effects – that is for people far wiser than us. Our task is the mundane challenge of causing something to happen: we do things; we transform intent to action. Our mantra: "**who does what by when?**"

If my peers are **strategic architects**, we are probably **strategic ditchdiggers** ... but it is still **noble work**.



Our **agenda** today.

As I just explained, our **main purpose** is to describe the **major operations** that support the Joint Campaign and the Joint Campaign Action Plan


But there are some **other significant operational activities** that merit your situational awareness:

The human, institutional and physical terrain is increasingly complex around here ... even more complex than how you left it. So we want to describe our **current liaison and partnership efforts** to you.

Efforts to find the **missing, captured and abducted** is always of primary concern to the Coalition

Our **civil-military operations are central enablers** to our full spectrum engagement

We will close with a weekly operations summary that will quickly portray for you the **operational trends over the last several months**.



- All of our major operations occur within the context of the JCP, a multiyear plan that takes us out to ***; and the JCAP 2007.

- From the MNFI perspective, with TF 1.4a TACON to MNFI, execution of our operations to defeat extremists is a major StratOps focus. There are two components to it:

- one, more established, focuses on TF 1.4a TF 1.4a and their efforts on the Al Qaeda network. It has an inherently Sunni focus
- The second, now emerging, targets 1.4b, 1.4d QODs force operatives in Iraq and their surrogates: the focus here is inherently Shia
- In each case, we have associated major operations, not unusual at MNFI level, to develop or refine our operational capabilities. The two most significant are recent instructions to reinforce fusion cells and our TST capabilities, and more recently the development of TF 1.4a the Task Force we are forming to address the 1.4b, 1.4d target set.

- There is also Operation Together Forward, the execution of the Baghdad Security Plan. This is a MNFI-lead, MND-B executed operation, but with major MNFI roles in reinforcing the MNFI efforts along the security line of operations with complementary actions from the Embassy and GoI ministries. Very challenging, and characterized by attempts to coordinate and synchronize strategic actions on tactical timelines.


- Regardless of what theory of war you use to understand this conflict, you either have to isolate the insurgency or fight the deep fight and that means securing the borders. The problems here are immense. We are going at it from a long term perspective, with a major operations to seek long term improvements at the border, and also symbolic short term actions through the closure and improvement of select Ports of Entry.

- We are guided by a Bridging Strategy that will – given the achievement of appropriate conditions – significantly adjust the set of Coalition Forces to improve the force allocation to transition teams and precision operations.

- Finally, to facilitate these operations we monitor and assist in execution of force flow operations

planned by SPA and managed by R&S.

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As I said earlier, the human, institutional and physical terrain is increasingly complex around here ... a quick review for you of just how complex:

You have the Ministry of Defense, to include the Joint Headquarters and its operations center the JOC, commanding the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, the Strategic Infrastructure units, and its own information service

You have a parallel, police security function in the Ministry of the Interior, with a NCC commanding the National Police, recently the FPS, the DBE, and the NIIA

Across Iraq you have 18 provinces operating with breathtaking autonomy and very diverse standards, in theory coordinated in each province across the interagencies at the PJCCs ...

... who report to the NJOC, which is currently transforming to the NOC – the National Operations Center

All of this is overseen at the national level by an evolving security architecture, the primary components of which are the PM's Chief of Staff, the National Security Advisor, assisted by a liaison and communications element in the PM's Situation Room, and a newly emerging entity called the Office of the Commander in Chief and of course the Iraqi National Intelligence Service


(I have not attempted to – and cannot – draw clear lines of authority between these national level security elements)

But we do know that our corresponding architecture includes you as the CG, your MNFI Strategic Operations Center (SOC) focused primarily at the national level, and the MNFI focused on its counterpart the IGFC

You will see that I mentioned the MND-B, and that is because an emerging complexity is the strategic primacy of the Baghdad Security Plan – and the ongoing standup of the Baghdad Operations Center – whose commander LTG Aboud reports directly to the Prime Minister and will be in command of both IA

and NP units. And of course Operation Together Forward is of interest not only to MND-B, which partners at the Iraqi division level, but also to the MNCI, which partners with the BOC, and MNFI which partners at the national level.


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To help address these complexities, we have an array of liaison elements that assist at the critical points as shown

Security Coordination Committee Efforts:

1. National Operations Center (NOC)
2. Quick Reaction Forces in MoD (Iraqi Special Operations Force) and MoI (Emergency Response Unit)
3. Crisis Management Committee/Capability at the National Joint Operations Center (NJOC)
4. Liaison and Information Improvements
5. Notification of Operations-Iraqi Security Forces
6. Division of Responsibility between GoI, ISF and MNF-I Transition (Tactical Coordination)
7. Tier 1 officials – Transfer of security contracts (Dignitary protection)



The liaison and partnership challenge is not only institutionally and organizationally complex – it is also physically complex on the ground.

Our relative authorities and responsibilities evolve in accordance with our transition status.

On the ground – where rounds fly at meters per second and people can get hurt, who can do what by when can often depend on physical location, transition status, PIC transfer status, and the nature of the target and the engaging force



OCF

CJSOTF

Special Restrictions:



Sites

Individuals

 Joint Personnel Recovery Center 		
(b)(3), (b)(6) (DOD)	17 Jan 91 (Date isolated)	(b)(3), (b)(6)
F/A-18 crashed during DESERT STORM. Intel suggests his remains at former Baghdad prison. An SSE of prison is planned for early March 07		
(b)(3), (b)(6) (DOD)	9 Apr 04	(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(6) (DOD Ctr)	9 Apr 04	(b)(3), (b)(6)
Sunnī insurgents attacked convoy and captured both persons. Intel suggests remains IVO Abu Ghraib. Three SSEs to recover are planned for late Feb 07. 86 recovery missions to date.		
(b)(6) (AMCIT)	11 Apr 05	(b)(6)
Masked gunman demanded to see American, then abducted him at a water bottling plant IVO Taji.		
(b)(3), (b)(6) (DOD)	23 Oct 06	(b)(3), (b)(6)
Kidnapped by JAM in Karada district of Baghdad. Assessed to be alive and held in Sadr City. 62 Raids to date. 53 suspected JAM detained. 14c		
Crescent Security Group (AMCIT)	16 Nov 06	(b)(6)
JAM attacked private PSD escorting convoy headed to Tallil. Proof of Life video released on 26 Dec. 4 Raids by MND-SE. 14c Assessed to be held in Basra.		
(b)(6) (AMCIT)	5 Jan 07	(b)(6)
Detained by Amarah IP on 4 Jan and released on 5 Jan. While enroute to Basrah, he was kidnapped. Believed to be held with Crescent Security Group hostages		
20 Total Missing Americans; of that number, 3 x DOD Service Members Missing/Captured 9 Missing "Persons of Interest" crucial to the security and stability of Iraq 29 Total Missing Persons to be recovered		

Some of our most important JPRC missions ongoing at this time

In addition to these missing Americans, the Ambassador and you can declare "Persons of Interest" – in some cases not American citizens – who are critical to the security and stability of Iraq.



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CMO Directorate Current Actions


- **Urgent Essential Services**
 - Working Infrastructure Hardening projects for Oil and Electrical
 - Working to improve the quality and capability of the Security Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs)
- **National Iraqi Assistance Center (NIAC):**
 - Job Fair for local Iraqis on 24 Feb with 31 Vendors
- **United Nations Mission – Iraq (UNAMI) LNO**
 - Assessing and developing courses of action to deal with Palestinian refugees near the Syrian border
- **Agriculture**
 - Working with MND-CS on Dairy plant in Diwaniyah to produce 100,000 liters of milk per day to elementary schools
 - Working with Kurdish Minister of Agriculture to establish a honey processing center and supermarket in Kirkuk
- **Displacement & Migration**
 - Working the 'Evict Squatters' issue in Baghdad
- **Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) Kuwait**
 - Facilitating Transportation and loading and Shipment of medical supplies to Mosul and Diwaniyah
- **Elections Branch:**
 - Conducting Civil Affairs courses for IA & Marine 4th Civil Affairs Group
- **New Business**
 - Hosting a Kurdistan / UAE Business Exchange Conference (27 Feb-02 Mar 07) followed by tour of Kurdistan for businessmen one week later

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
06 Feb 07


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






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




































Sir,

There were 18 total SAFIRE events reported this week, up 8 from the previous week. Three helicopters received damage from SAFIRE this week. Two AH-64s and crews were lost, one IVO Najaf and one IVO Taji. One Blackwater Bell 412 performed a precautionary landing south of Baghdad. The helicopter was subsequently destroyed in place.

Next Slide Please...

Complex attack = more than one weapon type used ie SMARMS and U/I rocket.

Effective 3 Nov there was a change to the definitions of SAFIRE incidences:

New

Old

Close = .5 nm

2 nm or less

Distance = .5 to 2.0 nm


greater
than 2 to 5 nm

Observed = greater than 2 nm no affect on AC

Seen with no affect on the aircraft

MNF-I STRATOPS will continue to only report **close** SAFIRE incidences.

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Sir,

This slide depicts the weekly summary of Combined Forces Air Component Command operations in support of OIF.

Coalition Air Forces flew 2082 sorties this week in support of Operations in Iraq, including 492 strike/reconnaissance.

64 "Troops in Contact" calls were supported, 19 Shows of Force were executed and 89 weapons were expended during the week. Coalition aircraft delivered 19,722 passengers and 4,446 tons of cargo. Multiple strafing engagements on a single target by the same aircraft are considered a single weapon delivery.

BAGHDAD	16
BAQUBAH	4
NAJAF	63
TAJI	3
SALMAN PAK	3

In the first quarter 2007, the weekly average is 34 weapons expended by CFACC and MEF aircraft, up from 14 in the fourth quarter 2006. In January, the weekly average was 34 weapons, up from the December average of 16. All averages continue to trend upward.


While numerous platforms flew more sorties than scheduled for, there were 88 delta sortie cancellations this week. Maintenance was the primary cause for sortie cancellations:

- 37 Maintenance cancellations
- 23 Weather cancellations
- 14 Cancelled by requester
- 12 Other cancellations
- 2 Operations cancellation

Unsupported ASRs:

100 Higher Priorities
71 No Asset Available
8 Weather
2 Other

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This weeks Maritime picture:



•MV Foroud had major exclusion zone violation early morning 2 Feb 07. After ignoring repeated calls and signals to turn about, HMAS Toowoomba fired 26X .50 warning shots forward of the vessel. MV Foroud turned out of zone, answered hails and went DIW. Subsequent boarding and inspection cleared her for further operation. Indian Master stated it was his first transit of the NAG. Language difficulties with his 1.4b, 1.4d also contributed to the infraction.

•13 million barrels of crude oil were exported to commercial shipping via ABOT and 700 hundred thousand barrels via KAAOT in the past week. ABOT barrel numbers increased due to back flow


of weather delayed tankers. Reduced pumping capacity limits the size of vessel that will be filled at KAAOT. It takes KAAOT almost 5 days to pump 700,000 barrels; ABOT can pump 2,000,000 barrels


in less then two days. The limited capacity of KAAOT curtails the larger ships going along side.

• Maritime Interception & Security Operations continue in the North Arabian Gulf. February totals are 02 Queries and 02 Boardings.


	<div>SECRET // REL TO USA, UKRA, NATO, EU, UN, OAS, OSCE, AU, ECOWAS, SADC, COMESA, EAC, SCS, ACP, CAR, CEEAC, CEEAS, CEEAC, CEEAS, CEEAC, CEEAS</div> <h2>Strategic Assessments</h2>	
<u>GOVERNANCE</u>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none">Recent progress demonstrated with the CoR achieving a quorum and passing of the Elections Law, the 2007 budget, the Military Court Law, and voicing support for the BSPCoR is recessed until early March. Key actions that remain are the Law of Governorates, De-Ba'athification Reform, and the Hydro-Carbon Law.		
<u>SECURITY</u>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none">Operations across Iraq are degrading AIF networks, their command and control and their freedom of movement resulting in higher EKIA and a slight decrease in the rate of attack effectiveness on CF.Combined operations continue to develop ISF capabilities and build local confidence. US and GoI forces continue to support the BSP in Baghdad districts as part of the disrupt, clear, control, retain strategy.		
<u>ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT</u>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none">Availability of essential services, especially electricity, continues to be problematic and undermines GoI legitimacy. Disrupted power from other regions combined with below-average production from local generating plants is significantly impacting Baghdad.Limited availability of basic fuels continues to be a source of dissatisfaction.Plans to reinvigorate select State Owned Enterprises (SOE) are progressing under DOD-sponsorship.		
<u>COMMUNICATING</u>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none">GoI developing an ever-improving strategic communications capability, using it to improve perceptions of GoI sovereignty, ISF capabilities, economic developments, and functioning government.Expanded sectarian violence and perception of Sunni marginalization hinders acceptance of reconciliation and the peaceful political process.		
<u>TRANSITION</u>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none">The BOC is expected to be at FOC on 15 FEB with LTG Aboud assuming C2 on 1 MAR.Deployments of IA units in support of the Baghdad Security Plan is proceeding acceptably. NP units continue to re-blue and assume battle space in the Baghdad area (1/1 NP Re-blued and 7/2 NP Begins Re-blueing o/a 18 FEB)		
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This slide depicts upcoming events with potential security implications. An AAR for Ashura was held yesterday with planners from MoI and JHQ to review ISF Security plan for Arba'een o/a 10 March. No adjustments to the overall ISF plan were made. Next slide, please.

****Notes**

Death of 3rd Imam – o/a 29 Jan buried in Husayn Shrine, Karbala

Ashura – o/a 29 Jan Major Shi'a celebration, 40 day mourning period marking battlefield death of 3rd Imam.

- MNF-I WARNORD & FRAGO published 8 Dec & 5 Jan respectively – MNC-I published WARNORD & FRAGO 5 Dec & 30 Dec

1st Anniversary of Golden Mosque Bombing – Samarra

- Event occurred last year on 22 Feb (23 Muharram), will occur this year on 11 Feb based on shift of Arabic calendar
- Reconstruction is getting underway this Spring
- No Addit'l Security Req'd

Death of Sadiq Al Sadr – 19 Feb

- No Addit'l Security Req'd

Birth of 5th Imam – 21 Feb

- Muhammad Ali, buried in Medina, KSA
- No Addit'l Security Req'd

Birth of 7th Imam – 25 Feb

- Musa Ja'far, Buried in Al Kazimiyah, Baghdad
- No Addit'l Security Req'd

Arba'een – o/a 10 March

- Marks the end of Ashura with pilgrimage between Najaf and Karbala.
- WARNORD 8 Dec & FRAGO 4 Jan

Death of Prophet Mohammad – 18 March

- Buried in Medina, KSA
- Increased local Mosque attendance
- No Addit'l Security Req'd

Noruz – Persian New Year – 21 March

- Celebration of Righteousness Divine Spirit Asha Vanishta, Creator of Fire.
- No Addit'l Security Req'd

Death of 11th Imam – 27 March

- Al-Hassan Ali al-Askari, buried in Samarra, Iraq
- No Addit'l Security Req'd

Death of 8th Imam – 29 March

- No Addit'l Security Req'd

Mawlid an-Nabi – 31 March

- No Addit'l Security Req'd

[illegible]

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